# Taiwan's unexplained bank transfers: what Android users should check on their phones now

> Taiwan's regulator says transfers in five disputed online-banking cases all passed two-factor checks, and the cause is with the police. What Android users anywhere can check on their phones meanwhile.

Source: https://sheng.page/en/posts/taiwan-online-banking-transfers-android-what-to-check/ · Published: 2026-11-20 · Author: Sheng

On 19 November, Taiwan's Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) said four banks had reported five cases of online-banking transfers that customers say they never made, NT$566,512 in total across five customers. According to the banks' first checks, every transfer passed two-factor verification and went through the phone linked to the customer's account, and no intrusion or flaw was found in the banks' systems. Whether the phones themselves were compromised is a question for police forensics.

The cause is still open, and my own reading is that the problem very probably sits on the phone, with an app that was given permissions it should not have. That is an inference. None of this is specific to Taiwan: the same checks apply to anyone who banks on an Android phone, and they do not need to wait for the investigation.

## Start with this list

Anyone can run through the steps in the next section. Pay particular attention if any of these applies to you:

- You have installed an app from outside the Play Store, such as an APK from a link, an install file sent over a messaging app, or an 'update' offered by a web page.
- An app has asked you to turn on Accessibility for it, or to 'Allow restricted settings', and its stated purpose does not explain why it needs that access.
- An app you do not recognise can read your notifications or text messages.
- Your browser, messaging app or file manager is allowed to install unknown apps.
- Developer options, USB debugging or wireless debugging were switched on at some point and never switched off.
- You followed a guide to spoof GPS for a game, or to run a modified app or helper tool, and it had you enable developer options, pick a mock location app, or turn on wireless debugging so an app could pair with the phone itself.
- Play Protect is off, or the phone has not had a system update for a long time.

If money has already left your account and you did not do it, leave the apps on the phone alone. Call your bank from another phone you trust and report it to the police, and ask them how the phone should be preserved. Do not uninstall anything or reset the phone until you know it is not needed as evidence.

## What to check

These steps are for people who have had no loss and want to look things over. Menu names differ between manufacturers, so search within Settings if you cannot find one.

1. Accessibility: look under 'Downloaded apps' for services that are switched on, and turn off any whose purpose is unclear or that you no longer need.
2. Notification access: called 'Notification read, reply & control' on some versions. See which apps may read notifications and withdraw what is not needed. Look at SMS under Permission manager as well.
3. Install unknown apps: 'Allow from this source' should be off for your browser, messaging apps and file manager.
4. Device admin apps and 'Display over other apps': keep only apps whose origin you have confirmed and that you still use.
5. Play Protect: make sure it is on, and run a scan.
6. Developer options: switch the whole thing off if you do not use it. If a computer was ever authorised for debugging, tap 'Revoke USB debugging authorisations' first, remove any paired devices under Wireless debugging, and set 'Select mock location app' back to none.
7. Updates: install the latest security update and Google Play system update. Android 16 adds Advanced Protection, which blocks sideloading, and on Android 17 it also limits accessibility services to verified accessibility tools, with some features restricted as a result.

Malware can hide its icon, so these checks cannot establish that a phone is safe even if nothing looks suspicious. If you find a suspicious app and are sure nothing needs preserving, consider a backup followed by a factory reset. Leave that app out when you restore the backup, and do not install it again.

## What is known so far

| Claim | Source | Standing |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Four banks, five cases, NT$566,512, all through two-factor verification and the phone linked to the account | Chang Chia-kuei, deputy director-general of the FSC Banking Bureau, briefing of 19 November | Official, based on the banks' first checks |
| The transfer came from the bound device, passed the login password and biometrics (or a transaction password), and the IP matched the customer's history | Hua Nan Bank, as reported by Commercial Times on 13 November | Bank statement, one case |
| Login, two-factor and the OTP for a non-designated transfer were all completed correctly; the customer's device or outside network is not ruled out | Taipei Fubon Bank, as reported by Commercial Times on 18 November | Bank statement |
| Reported possible common traits: victims used Android phones, had clicked unknown sites or links, and saw no OTP | Mirror Media on 19 November, citing 'a review by banks' | Media account, no sample size |
| APKs borrowing the name and icon of a short-drama app carry SpyNote, SpyMax and BTMOB | Wang Ching-hung, a security consultant, on TVBS on 19 November | Expert conjecture; no published match against these five cases |
| OTP text messages may have been intercepted before reaching the phone, for instance by SilentAir | Unnamed security vendors in United Daily News on 19 November | Conjecture; the report itself says there is no public evidence of a link |

More cases are circulating on social media than the official count, including a family who say the transfers happened while the account holder was asleep and no OTP text arrived. Public information does not show whether those claims overlap with the five reported cases. The [Bank SinoPac incident of 3 November](/en/posts/sinopac-abnormal-transfers-what-one-transfer-needs/) is a separate matter: the bank's own account is that an outside attacker used a supplier's security setting in its new online-banking system.

## Why I think it is most likely the phone

The most concrete public detail is the Hua Nan case. The transfer was sent from the customer's bound device, cleared the login password and biometrics (or a transaction password), and came from the usual IP address. The Banking Bureau said of all five that they went through the linked phone. Given Hua Nan's reported device and IP records, and a customer who says they did nothing, the straightforward reading is that something else was operating that phone, which is why I put the odds high.

It remains an inference, since device and IP records say nothing about who was holding the phone or whether malware was present, and intercepted text messages are still possible. The matching IP is from the Hua Nan case alone, and details of the others have not been published.

A malicious app can do this with permissions the user has granted, even where there is no vulnerability. Accessibility services exist for assistive tools, and an app that holds one can read the screen and tap on the user's behalf. Crocodilus, which ThreatFabric documented in March 2025, used that access to log what was on screen, cover the display with a black overlay, mute the phone and let a remote operator finish the transfer. That report listed Spain and Turkey as targets, and I have found nothing tying it to Taiwanese banks, so I cannot treat a similar method as evidence for these cases.

On where such apps come from, Google published a figure in February 2024: for the major fraud malware families that abuse SMS, notification and accessibility permissions, over 95 per cent of installations came from internet-sideloading sources such as browsers, messaging apps and file managers. Since Android 13, 'restricted settings' stop a sideloaded app from asking for accessibility access directly. ThreatFabric described droppers getting round that in November 2023, and a user can lift the restriction by hand from the app's info page.

Public statements are not enough to say what 'no OTP arrived' means. The Banking Bureau said two-factor verification includes biometrics along with SMS OTP. Hua Nan's statement mentions biometrics or a transaction password, while Taipei Fubon says the OTP check for the non-designated transfer was completed. Whether a given transfer sends a text at all depends on which method it used.

Establishing the cause will require forensic findings, including which apps were on a victim's phone and whether the texts were delivered. I will update this post when the police or the Banking Bureau publish findings, and the view above may have to change.

## Developer options and remote access

Enabling developer options alone does not give someone remote access to your phone. Android's documentation says USB debugging requires the phone to be unlocked and the computer's RSA key to be accepted on screen, and wireless debugging requires pairing with a code or QR code while phone and computer share a Wi-Fi network. The first authorisation always happens on the phone's screen. A stored authorisation that is still valid is usually not asked for again.

An app can do the tapping, and Zimperium reported on 19 August 2026 that ToxicPanda 2.0 abuses the accessibility service to enable wireless debugging and obtain shell-user capabilities, then grants itself further permissions and keeps itself running. In that case developer options were used to widen access after the malware was already in, and leaving them on adds another route, though I would not call the feature itself a vulnerability.

Spoofing GPS for a game means choosing a mock location app inside developer options. Some tools go further and ask the user to enable wireless debugging and complete the pairing on the phone itself, so that an app can run with adb's permissions; Shizuku's own setup guide describes that flow. These tools have legitimate uses. Developer options or wireless debugging enabled during setup may stay on afterwards, though, and those are the features ToxicPanda 2.0 abuses. No public information connects the five cases to this kind of use. If you have set a phone up this way, check that you switched things off afterwards and that each app's permissions match what it actually does.

Android 17's adb Wi-Fi 2.0 turns wireless debugging on and off according to whether the network is trusted. Tick 'always allow on this network' and the phone permits wireless debugging whenever it joins that network, and turns it off on untrusted ones. A computer still has to be paired first. Nobody has linked developer options to the five cases, so if you do not write apps, switch it off. Those of us who do tend to leave it on; turn it off on the phone you carry every day and keep a separate device for testing.

## What can be done beyond the phone

On the app side, if you build a banking or payment app, Android 14 and later let you mark login and transaction-confirmation views with `accessibilityDataSensitive`, so that only services declaring `android:isAccessibilityTool="true"` can read them or act on them. From Android 16 the same flag also blocks gestures injected through `AccessibilityService.dispatchGesture` by other services.

On the server, a successful check alone does not establish that the customer intended the transfer. Sequences such as device binding or biometrics being switched off shortly before a transfer, or several transfers within minutes in the small hours, can feed a separate risk decision. That is general design advice, and I do not know what individual banks do.

Platform protections vary by region. Play Protect's enhanced fraud protection blocks a sideloaded install when the app declares those sensitive permissions. It began as a pilot in Singapore in 2024, and in February 2026 Google said it had been expanded to 185 markets without publishing the list, so check what applies where you live. Developer verification took effect on 30 September 2026, and its first phase covers only installs from participating stores on certified devices in Brazil, Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand. Direct sideloading is not covered yet, and a global rollout is planned from 2027. Android 16 also has in-call protection: during a call with a number outside your contacts, the system blocks a first-time sideload and the granting of accessibility access. Where those protections do not reach, the user is still the one who taps 'Allow', so keep permissions and unused features off where you can, and there is less for something else to use.

## Notes

- The official count is four banks, five cases and NT$566,512, all through two-factor verification and the phone linked to the account. The cause remains under investigation, and no findings from a phone examination have been published.
- I judge it very likely that the fault is on the phone, based on the device and IP records reported for the Hua Nan case. This is an inference and the post will be updated when findings appear.
- A malicious app can operate on granted permissions such as accessibility. Google's 2024 figure for the major fraud malware families is over 95 per cent of installs from internet sideloading.
- The first debugging authorisation needs action on the phone, yet malware has been seen enabling wireless debugging through accessibility after infection. If you turned developer options on for GPS spoofing or a helper tool, switch it off again.
- The checklist only finds anomalies. After a loss, go to the bank and the police, and do not uninstall or reset until it is clear whether the phone has to be kept as evidence.
- Finance apps can protect sensitive views with `accessibilityDataSensitive`. Developer verification is in its first phase in four countries and does not yet cover direct sideloading.

## Further reading

- [Four banks report further unauthorised transfers to the FSC](https://udn.com/news/story/7239/9889478): United Daily News on the Banking Bureau briefing of 19 November, in Chinese. The official figures and Chang's remarks come from here; I found no FSC press release of its own.
- [Business Today](https://www.businesstoday.com.tw/article/category/183017/post/202611190046/) and [ETtoday](https://finance.ettoday.net/news/3275197): reports of the same briefing, in Chinese, for the linked-phone remark and the referral to police forensics.
- [Hua Nan Bank](https://www.ctee.com.tw/news/20261113701056-430304) and [Taipei Fubon Bank](https://www.ctee.com.tw/news/20261118701792-430201): Commercial Times paraphrasing the banks' statements, in Chinese, so the wording is the reporter's.
- [Mirror Media on three shared traits](https://www.mirrormedia.mg/story/20261119edi076): a media account of a review by banks, in Chinese, with no sample size, so no more than a lead.
- [TVBS on fake short-drama apps](https://news.tvbs.com.tw/life/4052832): one expert's account, in Chinese, with no sample details published.
- [United Daily News on intercepted OTP texts](https://udn.com/news/story/7239/9887742): conjecture from unnamed vendors, in Chinese; the piece itself says that no public evidence links it to these cases.
- [Bank SinoPac press conference](https://www.cna.com.tw/news/afe/202611040331.aspx): Central News Agency wire report, in Chinese, for the cause given for the 3 November incident.
- [Piloting new ways of protecting Android users from financial fraud](https://security.googleblog.com/2024/02/piloting-new-ways-to-protect-Android-users-from%20financial-fraud.html): Google Security Blog, a primary source for the 95 per cent figure and the four permissions.
- [How we kept the Google Play & Android app ecosystems safe in 2024](https://blog.google/security/how-we-kept-google-play-android-app-ecosystem-safe-2024/) and [Keeping Google Play & Android app ecosystem safe in 2025](https://blog.google/security/keeping-google-play-android-app-ecosystem-safe-2025/): Google, primary sources for the pilot and the 185 markets.
- [Learn about restricted settings](https://support.google.com/android/answer/12623953?hl=en): Android Help, a primary source.
- [Android Debug Bridge (adb)](https://developer.android.com/tools/adb) and [Configure on-device developer options](https://developer.android.com/studio/debug/dev-options): Android documentation, primary sources for debugging authorisation, adb Wi-Fi 2.0 and mock location.
- [Shizuku setup guide](https://shizuku.rikka.app/guide/setup/): the open-source tool's own guide, cited to show the 'enable wireless debugging and pair on the device' flow. Citing it does not imply the tool is unsafe.
- [Tapjacking](https://developer.android.com/privacy-and-security/risks/tapjacking): Android documentation, a primary source for `accessibilityDataSensitive`.
- [Android developer verification](https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2026/06/android-developer-verification.html) and the [developer verification FAQ](https://developer.android.com/developer-verification/guides/faq?hl=en): Android, primary sources for the dates, countries and scope of the first phase.
- [What's new in Android security and privacy in 2025](https://blog.google/security/whats-new-in-android-security-privacy-2025/), [Advanced Protection updates](https://blog.google/security/android-advanced-protection-updates/) and [Advanced Protection Mode](https://developer.android.com/privacy-and-security/advanced-protection-mode): Google, primary sources for in-call protection and Advanced Protection.
- [Droppers bypassing Android 13 restrictions](https://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/droppers-bypassing-android-13-restrictions) and [Exposing Crocodilus](https://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/exposing-crocodilus-new-device-takeover-malware-targeting-android-devices): ThreatFabric research, vendor reports that include details of malware behaviour.
- [The ToxicPanda never sleeps](https://zimperium.com/blog/the-toxicpanda-never-sleeps-toxicpanda-2.0-prepares-its-next-strike-on-mobile): Zimperium research, a vendor report and the source for the wireless-debugging case; it includes details of malware behaviour.

> Ideas and technical judgement by Sheng; drafted with Claude · facts researched with Grok, reviewed by Codex; I tried to verify the checks on OrbStack with redroid (Android 9 to 15) but the system never came up, so nothing here was tested on a device or emulator and menu names follow Google's help pages; facts checked up to 02:00 on 20 November 2026 (Taipei time)