Last year Chunghwa Telecom, this year TWCA: what to check before the 6 November deadline
Last year it was Chunghwa Telecom: from Chrome 139, on platforms using the Chrome Root Store, TLS server certificates chaining to two specified roots lost default trust if their earliest SCT fell after 31 July 2025 (UTC). This year TWCA (Taiwan-CA) has announced a certificate replacement. Its previous intermediate CA “must be revoked by 00:00 on November 6, 2026”, customer certificates are being re-signed under a new intermediate with the same key pair, and you are asked to install the full chain. A replacement runbook needs to be ready.
The announced actions differ. Chunghwa was a Chrome Root Program decision, with a cut-off based on whether the earliest SCT fell after 31 July 2025 (UTC); earlier certificates were unaffected by that change. TWCA is a CA replacing its own intermediate, and as of this check the three bugs contained no Mozilla or Chrome decision on these incidents. The work is straightforward: find where TLS terminates, install the new certificate with the full chain before the deadline, then look at what the server sends from outside your network.
The 31 October notice leaves gaps. It gives no time zone for 00:00, no list of the intermediates to be revoked, and no fingerprints. It says nothing about whether subscriber certificates will be revoked. A later notice on 5 November covers this (see the update below). The new chain was later published on a TWCA deployment page. The same week produced public reports on two other issues: serial number entropy and unauthorised access to an RA server. A second TWCA notice, on 2 November, says the replacement is to bring serial numbers into line with the rules, and that it was not prompted by a website intrusion or a leaked private key. That is TWCA’s own account; no independent finding confirms it. How the RA incident relates to the replacement and the serial number issue is still unclear, so this post keeps the three apart. Sources were first checked at 20:44 Taipei time on 2 November 2026, together with the example run, then rechecked at 22:12 and checked again at 00:35 on 5 November.
Update (5 November 2026, 20:15 Taipei): TWCA’s notice of 5 November says that more than 85% of customer websites had been updated by 10:30 that day. From 00:00 on 6 November it expects to revoke website certificates whose serial numbers do not meet the randomness requirement; the time zone is still not given. The Financial Supervisory Commission said the financial sector had about 4,190 certificates, roughly 95% updated by 14:30. The three bugs have had no new comments since 3 November. Facts checked by Claude, second review by Codex (gpt-6-astra), tone by Grok.
Update (5 November 2026, 01:10 Taipei): TWCA has confirmed in 2087236 that some subscriber certificate serials carry only 63 bits of CSPRNG output. This update adds TWCA’s 2 November notice, the new chain from its deployment page, the Ministry of Digital Affairs’ reissue figures, the app and bank notices, and an iThome interview with TWCA. The reason for the replacement, the new intermediate names and the open questions now follow those sources. Facts gathered by Claude Fable, second review by Codex (gpt-6-astra), tone by Grok, checked by Claude.
Timeline
- 29 October 2026, 08:07 UTC: TWCA self-reports Bugzilla 2086949, signs of unauthorised access to an RA server.
- 29 October, 19:31 UTC: outside researchers open 2087236 on low randomness in CA certificate serial numbers. The report’s own timeline says 30 October; the system record is used here.
- 31 October: TWCA publishes the SSL renewal notice.
- 1 November: TWCA’s deployment page says the certificate chain update starts on this date. Taiwan’s Ministry of Digital Affairs (MODA) says government certificates were reissued the same day.
- 2 November, 00:16 UTC: 2087918 reports a separate entropy problem in subscriber certificate serials. TWCA replies at 04:08 UTC that the full report will be folded into 2087236.
- 2 November: TWCA’s second notice says the replacement is for serial number compliance. MODA publishes its reissue figures.
- 3 November, 04:50 UTC: in 2087236 Comment 5, TWCA posts its preliminary report for 2087918 and confirms the 63-bit finding.
- 5 November: Chunghwa Post updates the security certificate built into its mobile post office app. TWCA publishes a progress and revocation notice saying it plans to revoke non-compliant website certificates from 00:00 on 6 November; the Financial Supervisory Commission reports financial-sector progress.
- 6 November, 00:00 (time zone not stated): deadline for the previous intermediate.
- 12 November, 19:00 UTC (03:00 on 13 November in Taipei): the date TWCA has committed to for its full incident report.
A few questions from the ops side
Replacing certificates takes scheduling, and scheduling needs a time and a list. The notice happens to give neither. TWCA’s listed shareholders are the Taiwan Stock Exchange, the Taiwan Depository and Clearing Corporation, the Financial Information Service Co. and 網際威信 (HiTRUST). The notice date, 31 October, and the deadline, 6 November, are six calendar days apart. It gives no time zone for 00:00 and lists no intermediates or fingerprints. The Chinese text says 廢止 and the English text says revoked, so operators should plan for revocation. The deployment page later filled in the new chain, but the list of old intermediates and the time zone are still missing. Could TWCA add those two, so operators can actually plan the work?
Those are the visible gaps. How the work was planned inside, and why the notice reads as it does, the public record does not say, and this post will not guess. The full report due on 12 November concerns the serial number incidents; whether it will clarify the renewal notice remains unknown. Operators should replace the chain before the notice’s deadline.
The public records
The renewal notice
The stated reason, in the Chinese text, is adjusting the intermediate certificate profile to meet international requirements, citing CA/Browser Forum rules. Customer certificates are re-signed under the new intermediate with the existing key pair and must be installed with the full chain. The Chinese text says the old intermediate will be 廢止; the English text on the same page says revoked, so plan for revocation. There is no list of intermediates, no fingerprints, nothing on subscriber revocation, browsers or fees. The support line is 02-2370-8886 ext. 9, and SSL sales is 0800-002-666. The notice covers SSL customer certificates only, and nothing here extends it to TWCA’s other products.
The second notice, on 2 November, is more specific about the reason. It says the CA/Browser Forum asked TWCA to fix the randomness of its website certificate serials so that each holds at least 64 random bits. The notice says “此次調整主要涉及憑證序號產生方式的規格符合性,並非因網站遭受入侵或憑證私鑰外洩所引發”: the change concerns how serial numbers are generated, and was not prompted by a website intrusion or a leaked certificate private key. That is TWCA’s claim. TWCA is reissuing government certificates, with no new application needed. The deadline is again before 00:00 on 6 November, and the time zone is still not given.
MODA’s press release of 2 November reports 962 agencies and 9,772 website certificates. TWCA reissued them on 1 November and emailed the original applicants; by the evening of 2 November, 926 had been updated. A reissued certificate is not a deployed one, and 926 is a figure for that evening only. The release also says the serials were designed as 128 bits but only the first and last 12 bits are effectively random, 24 bits in all. The total matches 2087236, but the random bits are not in the same place as the reporters’ trailing 3 bytes. The release does not say which class of certificate it means, so it cannot be tied to the same set. MODA says it has commissioned a third-party audit and will impose contractual penalties and claim damages.
Bug 2087236: CA serial numbers
Opened by Prasanth Sundararajan and co-signed by Dr. Angelique Faye Loe. The reporters break the serial down as a 1-byte prefix, the notBefore date, zero padding, a 2-byte counter and 3 random bytes, so at most 24 bits look random. The TLS Baseline Requirements (BR) ask for at least 64 bits of CSPRNG output. They checked 24 CA certificates issued from TWCA’s publicly trusted root keys (2011-06-10 to 2024-09-06). Of the 18 issued after 2016-09-30, the reporters count 11 as within the TLS BR (10 unrevoked at the time of the report, 1 revoked as superseded on 2023-08-17), 2 are the self-signed roots TWCA CYBER Root CA and TWCA Global Root CA G2, and the remaining 5 are not claimed to be in scope.
At the time of the report, six TLS issuing intermediates were unrevoked. Fingerprints are in the crt.sh links inside the bug:
- TWCA SSL Certification Authority, signed by CYBER Root, one each on 2023-02-23 and 2024-09-06.
- TWCA EVSSL Certification Authority, signed by CYBER Root, one each on 2023-02-23 and 2024-09-06.
- TWCA Secure SSL Certification Authority, signed by Global Root, one each on 2023-08-18 and 2023-10-16.
That is the reporters’ list. The notice gives no list of intermediates to be revoked, so the two cannot be matched. The reporters also sampled 1,631 subscriber serials from 29 CRLs and saw no problem; 2087918 later covered subscriber certificates. They write “We have no evidence of key compromise, certificate misuse or any exploitation.” and “A short serial number does not by itself allow forgery with SHA-256 signatures.”, and say BR 4.9.1.2 and 4.9.5 “may apply”. In Comment 3 TWCA acknowledges the report, says it is investigating, and commits to a full report by 19:00 UTC on 12 November 2026. Root cause and the other sections still read “For TWCA to complete”.
Bug 2087918: subscriber serial numbers
Daniel C looked at about 1,600 certificates from 2025 CT logs plus a few recent unexpired ones. Going by TWCA’s earlier description, the last 8 bytes of the serial should hold 64 bits of HSM CSPRNG output, yet the top bit was always 0 and the top byte stayed between 0x00 and 0x7F. The issuing CAs seen were TWCA EVSSL Certification Authority, TWCA Global EVSSL Certification Authority, TWCA Secure SSL Certification Authority and TWCA SSL Certification Authority. The number affected is unknown. TWCA replied “Both incidents involve insufficient serial number entropy.” and is folding the report into 2087236. It then posted a preliminary report as 2087236 Comment 5: “TWCA confirmed that affected subscriber certificate serial numbers contain only 63 bits of CSPRNG output”, with the affected population “being determined”. There is no count yet.
An iThome article of 3 November quotes a TWCA vice president. When the rules changed in 2016, the vice president says, only the subscriber issuing software was updated and the CA-side software was not; subscriber website serials comply, and the problem is in the CA certificates above them. That does not square with Comment 5, posted at 12:50 Taipei time the same day. The article gives no interview time, so which came first is unknown. The written report on Bugzilla is the one to go by.
Bug 2086949: the RA server
Self-reported by TWCA, status ASSIGNED. Security monitoring picked up signs of unauthorised access to an RA server, which has been isolated while the investigation continues. The report says “No certificate mis-issuance has been identified to date.” Only the preliminary report exists. Scope, cause, and any link to the serial number issue are all unknown. A further check at 00:35 on 5 November still found only that first report.
As of 00:35 on 5 November, none of the three bugs carries a decision on these incidents from the Mozilla or Chrome root programmes, and no related distrust announcement turned up. That is what the sources showed at the time, not a promise that trust will hold.
Why serial numbers need to be random
BR v2.3.1 requires serialNumber to be a non-sequential number greater than zero and less than 2^159, containing at least 64 bits of CSPRNG output. Ballot 164 in 2016 gave the reason: random bits make hash collision attacks harder. The 2008 rogue CA research predicted the serial number and validity period, then used an MD5 collision. That is background only, not evidence that the same attack occurred in this incident.
Length and randomness are separate questions. The CA serials in 2087236 are like a lottery ticket that prints the draw date first and only rolls a few digits at the end: a long string, with just the last 3 bytes actually drawn. The subscriber sample in 2087918 has the top bit of the last 8 bytes fixed at 0, which caps the possible values at 2^63. TWCA has since confirmed that affected subscriber serials carry only 63 bits of CSPRNG output. Both are low entropy, but the gaps are very different in size.
The earlier post Only 86 Million Ways to Shuffle: What Game RNG Certification Checks makes the same point from the gaming side: the entropy source and the final output need checking separately. Using a CSPRNG is only half of it; the code that takes its output and builds the serial decides how many random bits survive. TWCA has confirmed the result, 63 bits. Which step lost the last bit will have to wait for the full report. A check that stops at “we use an HSM” or “the serial is 128 bits long” would have missed it. Sixty-three bits is half the space of 64. That does not make the next serial guessable, or a collision certain, and it says nothing about private key strength. Game certification and TLS certificate issuance follow different standards; this post borrows the way of checking and does not treat it as a compliance standard.
Low entropy breaks the BR. It does not mean a private key leaked, a certificate was misused, or anyone can produce a fake that passes SHA-256 signature checks. The reporters found no sign of exploitation, and TWCA says no mis-issuance has been found in the RA case. Those sentences belong to different documents, and you can’t stitch them into “so it’s fine” or “so it was exploited”.
Four ways a connection fails
| Case | What happens | What this check shows |
|---|---|---|
| Expiry | The current time is past notAfter | The tested leaf runs to 2027-03-06, the intermediate to 2030-08-23 |
| Revocation | The client finds a revoked certificate on the path and rejects it | The English notice says the old intermediate must be revoked; TWCA’s 5 November notice adds that it plans to revoke non-compliant website certificates from 00:00 on 6 November |
| Root distrust | A root programme drops a root, so the path loses its trust anchor | No Mozilla or Chrome decision on these incidents in the three bugs |
| Missing chain | The server leaves out the intermediate, so the client cannot build a path | The notice asks for the full chain; the certificate itself can still be valid |
Think of the intermediate as a letter of introduction. The client knows the organisation at the root, the leaf certificate is a staff badge, and the intermediate vouches for the link. Forget the letter and reception cannot match the badge. An expired letter, a withdrawn letter and an organisation struck off the list are the other three cases, and each needs a different fix.
Once an intermediate is revoked, a client that obtains that revocation status will reject a path through it, even if the leaf itself is unrevoked and in date. A notAfter in 2027 or 2030 therefore proves nothing about the old chain after the deadline. BR 4.9.1.2 gives a CA seven days to revoke an intermediate once it learns the intermediate was issued out of compliance, among other reasons. For subscriber certificates, 4.9.1.1 item 12 says SHOULD within 24 hours and MUST within 5 days, with an exception for short-lived certificates. Those are the rules. TWCA’s 5 November notice says it expects to revoke website certificates with non-compliant serial numbers from 00:00 on 6 November. The notice gives no time zone and no list, so this post does not work out a further deadline. There is no need to change users’ browser trust settings.
Replacing and checking
The 31 October notice only says that customer certificates are re-signed under the new intermediate, the key pair stays, you install what you receive, and you include the full chain. The chain itself appeared later on TWCA’s deployment page. From the top it runs TWCA Global Root CA, TWCA CYBER Root CA, TWCA CYBER Root CA G3 Cross Cert, then TWCA SSL Certification Authority or TWCA EVSSL Certification Authority, then the server certificate. The page has five .cer files and CertReplaceTool.zip for download. It also warns that the new chain no longer supports clientAuth. Anyone using a server certificate as a client certificate needs to ask TWCA for an AP certificate. Where an app or host pins the chain, TWCA suggests deploying the new one early. The page does not say which old intermediates will be revoked, or give a deadline or time zone for that. A changed issuer name on its own is not enough. Compare the new certificate and its fingerprint. What follows is general ops practice, with verification left on:
- List the domains and services that use these TWCA SSL certificates, and where TLS terminates: load balancer, CDN, Ingress, IIS or the application itself.
- In Nginx, point
ssl_certificateat a fullchain file with the leaf first and the intermediate after it. In IIS, import the intermediate into the Local Computer “Intermediate Certification Authorities” store. In a Java keystore, update the chain on the private key entry. - Replace it where TLS actually terminates. If a CDN or load balancer terminates TLS in front, changing only the origin leaves the public chain as it was.
- Check the chain the server sends from outside, not the file on disk. A CT log search (crt.sh, for example) shows whether the new certificate or precertificate was logged. It does not show that it is deployed.
chain.sh only lists each certificate the server sends. Its output says nothing about whether chain validation, hostname checks or revocation checks passed. It writes certN.pem to the current directory and deletes cert*.pem at the end, so run it in an empty directory. The command and output below come from a single connection to www.twca.com.tw at 20:44 Taipei time on 2 November 2026, on macOS with LibreSSL 3.3.6, and are left exactly as captured.
#!/bin/sh
# 列出伺服器實際送出的每張憑證:subject、issuer、SHA-256 指紋、到期日
host="$1"
echo | openssl s_client -connect "$host:443" -servername "$host" -showcerts 2>/dev/null |
awk '/BEGIN CERTIFICATE/{n++; f="cert" n ".pem"} f{print > f} /END CERTIFICATE/{f=""}'
for f in cert*.pem; do
echo "== $f"
openssl x509 -in "$f" -noout -subject -issuer -enddate
openssl x509 -in "$f" -noout -fingerprint -sha256
done
rm -f cert*.pem
== cert1.pem
subject= /businessCategory=Private Organization/jurisdictionCountryName=TW/jurisdictionStateOrProvinceName=Taiwan/jurisdictionLocalityName=Taipei/serialNumber=70759028/C=TW/ST=Taiwan/L=Taipei/postalCode=100/street=10F.,NO.85,Yanping S. Rd.,Taipei City 100,Taiwan (R.O.C)/O=TAIWAN-CA INC./CN=www.twca.com.tw
issuer= /C=TW/O=TAIWAN-CA/OU=Global EVSSL Sub-CA/CN=TWCA Global EVSSL Certification Authority
notAfter=Mar 6 15:59:59 2027 GMT
SHA256 Fingerprint=53:D5:48:E7:AD:6E:B8:E5:DD:90:CE:34:45:33:06:8C:8F:E3:D2:9E:D2:4B:B2:E0:DA:51:36:DC:45:DF:8B:02
== cert2.pem
subject= /C=TW/O=TAIWAN-CA/OU=Global EVSSL Sub-CA/CN=TWCA Global EVSSL Certification Authority
issuer= /C=TW/O=TAIWAN-CA/OU=Root CA/CN=TWCA Global Root CA
notAfter=Aug 23 15:59:59 2030 GMT
SHA256 Fingerprint=49:69:5A:5F:0F:7E:F6:ED:F6:98:19:3D:99:ED:48:BA:AD:E2:0E:A4:57:40:3C:11:CE:AD:49:2C:45:86:65:DA
== cert3.pem
subject= /C=TW/O=TAIWAN-CA/OU=Root CA/CN=TWCA Global Root CA
issuer= /C=TW/O=TAIWAN-CA/OU=Root CA/CN=TWCA Root Certification Authority
notAfter=Oct 28 15:59:59 2030 GMT
SHA256 Fingerprint=8A:D4:7F:6D:70:A4:4F:A8:0A:F0:F9:31:12:5F:FE:3A:76:87:6F:FA:D2:19:A4:D4:0A:13:C0:38:DC:85:E6:9E
Three certificates came back: www.twca.com.tw, TWCA Global EVSSL Certification Authority, and TWCA Global Root CA. The third is issued by TWCA Root Certification Authority, which makes it a cross-certificate; having Root in its name does not make it the trust anchor here. All three notAfter times are 15:59:59 GMT, which is 23:59:59 the same day in Taipei. The same connection also recorded the leaf serial 47EA000000125CE071DBC24EAA7BA455 and notBefore 2026-02-26, which the script does not print. The cert2 fingerprint matches TWCA Global EVSSL Certification Authority in the 2087236 appendix. Whether it is one of the intermediates due on 6 November cannot be checked, because the notice has no list. It is a single sample, meant as a demonstration, and can neither confirm nor refute 2087918.
Pinning and other clients
If an app pins, first find out what it pins: intermediate, root or leaf, whole certificate or public key. An app pinning the old intermediate’s key will reject a new chain that contains no matching key, even when browsers accept it. With a root key pin, confirm that the new path still goes through that key. A leaf key pin should usually still match, since the key pair is unchanged, but normal certificate validation must still pass; a pin on the whole leaf certificate has to be updated after re-signing. Java, older Android and embedded truststores do not always share the desktop browsers’ trust anchors. A working browser proves nothing about them, so test each one.
There are already real cases. Chunghwa Post said on 4 November that its mobile post office app would update its built-in security certificate on 5 November, in step with TWCA. Users need V1.58.0 or later, and older versions stop working once the current certificate is no longer valid. The notice does not say whether the app pins certificates, so nothing is assumed here. The United Daily News reported on 4 November that TWCA told banks to help customers finish updating the chain by 23:59:59 on 5 November. It also reported that the Ministry of Finance told the eight state-owned banks to finish by 1 November and confirm their customers had updated. Hwatai Bank scheduled its mobile banking app to be unavailable from 17:00 to 19:00 on 4 November for an emergency certificate change.
Still unknown
- Which old intermediates will be revoked. The deployment page lists the new chain; the only list of old ones is still the reporters’ six in 2087236.
- The time zone for 00:00. Read as Taipei time it is 16:00 UTC on 5 November; read as UTC it is 08:00 on 6 November in Taipei. For scheduling, take the earlier one, 00:00 on 6 November Taipei time. The bank deadline of 23:59:59 on 5 November, as reported by the United Daily News, also has no time zone.
- Subscriber certificates: TWCA’s 5 November notice says it expects to revoke non-compliant website certificates from 00:00 on 6 November, with no time zone and no list of affected certificates. Whether the new and old intermediates share a key (this post has not compared the fingerprints and keys in the downloadable files), and whether there is a fee, are still unknown.
- How many subscriber certificates the 63-bit issue affects, and at which step the bit was lost.
- The scope and cause of the RA incident, and whether it has anything to do with the serial number issue. TWCA says the replacement was not prompted by a website intrusion. That is its own claim, and the RA incident has no full report yet.
- Replacement progress: MODA’s government figure still stops at 926 on the evening of 2 November. TWCA’s 5 November notice gives only a cross-sector total of more than 85%. The Financial Supervisory Commission gives about 95% for the financial sector.
- Worth following: the full report due before 19:00 UTC on 12 November (03:00 on 13 November in Taipei) and whether Root cause gets filled in; any Mozilla or Chrome action on these incidents in the three bugs; whether TWCA adds the old intermediate list, the time zone and the new fingerprints.
Notes
- The previous intermediate must be revoked by 00:00 on 6 November 2026; time zone and list not given. Customer certificates keep their key pair and need the full chain installed.
- TWCA says the replacement is about serial number compliance and was not prompted by a website intrusion or a leaked key; how the RA access report relates to the replacement and the serial number issue is still unclear.
- CA serials show at most 24 random-looking bits. TWCA has confirmed that affected subscriber serials hold only 63 bits, and the scope is still being worked out. That breaks the BR, but does not establish key compromise or show that forgery is possible.
- The new chain drops clientAuth. A reissued certificate is not a deployed one. Apps with an affected certificate, or with the chain built in, need the update their vendor specifies.
- Expiry, revocation, root distrust and a missing chain are four different failures. Once an intermediate is revoked, a distant notAfter does not guarantee that a path through it will work.
- Check the chain the server sends from outside, and test pinned apps, Java, older Android and embedded truststores separately.
Further reading
- TWCA progress and revocation notice, 5 November 2026 (Chinese): TWCA’s own account of update progress and the revocation of non-compliant website certificates.
- CNA, 5 November 2026 (Chinese): the Financial Supervisory Commission’s certificate count and progress for the financial sector, as reported.
- Doing the TWCA certificate replacement yourself: find the key, build the chain, install, confirm: the follow-up, a step-by-step replacement guide with tested commands for organisations without in-house IT.
- TWCA SSL certificate renewal notice: the issuer’s own notice of 31 October 2026; the English text on the same page says the old intermediate must be revoked.
- TWCA notice of 2 November 2026 (Chinese): the issuer’s account of why it is replacing certificates, including its statement that this was not an intrusion. Not an independent finding.
- TWCA TLS/SSL chain update page (Chinese): the new chain, downloads and the clientAuth warning; no list of old intermediates.
- MODA press release (Chinese): 2 November 2026, government certificate counts and that evening’s progress.
- Chunghwa Post app notice (Chinese): 4 November 2026, minimum app version; nothing on pinning.
- United Daily News, 4 November 2026 and Hwatai Bank maintenance notice (Chinese): bank deadlines and downtime; the first is press reporting, the second the bank’s own notice.
- iThome, 3 November 2026 (Chinese): an interview with a TWCA vice president, at odds with the written report on Bugzilla.
- Mozilla Bugzilla 2087236: the CA serial number report, TWCA’s Comment 3, and Comment 5 confirming the 63-bit finding; the opening time follows the system record.
- Mozilla Bugzilla 2087918: the subscriber serial report, where TWCA says the full report goes into 2087236.
- Mozilla Bugzilla 2086949: TWCA’s self-report of unauthorised RA access; preliminary report only.
- CA/Browser Forum TLS Baseline Requirements v2.3.1 (4 October 2026): the text on serial entropy and the seven-day and five-day revocation rules. It makes no ruling on this incident.
- CA/Browser Forum Ballot 164: the 2016 change that added serial entropy to the BR, with its reasoning.
- MD5 considered harmful today: the original 2008 rogue CA research.
- Google, Sustaining Digital Certificate Security - Upcoming Changes to the Chrome Root Store: the 30 May 2025 announcement behind the Chunghwa Telecom reference at the top; unrelated to TWCA.
- RFC 5280: validity, trust anchors, path validation and revocation checking.
- Nginx HTTPS configuration, Microsoft IIS intermediate certificates, Oracle keytool: chain order, the IIS store, and the chain on a Java private key entry.
- Certificate Transparency, How CT works: CT logs certificates and precertificates, not what a server is currently serving.
- Android network security configuration, OWASP Pinning Cheat Sheet: custom trust anchors, key pins and whole-certificate pins.
Ideas and technical judgement by Sheng; drafted with Claude · Topic chosen by Sheng; first draft by Grok (grok-4.7), finalised by Claude Fable, second review by Codex (gpt-6-astra), tightened by Claude, “A few questions from the ops side” first drafted by Grok; example run on macOS with LibreSSL 3.3.6, first-draft sources checked to 22:12 Taipei on 2 November 2026; the 5 November update was fact-checked by Claude Fable, written by Claude, reviewed by Codex (gpt-6-astra) and edited for tone by Grok, sources checked to 00:50 Taipei on 5 November and again at 19:30.